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CASE COMMENT
NO PAIN, NO GAIN: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
"SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF GENUINENESS" APPROACH
TO CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNDER THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3264, 62 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1993).
In Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA)2 permits railroad workers3 to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress if they state a claim that, under the totality
of the circumstances, has "sufficient indicia of genuineness."'
On a hot and humid August day,5 Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail),
1. 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3264, 62 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1993).
2. Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 135 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)).
3. FELA provides in relevant part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate or foreign] commerce..
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
carrier in such commerce... for such injury... resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
In a 1939 amendment, Congress made clear that FELA applied to railway workers whose duties are
"in the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce." Act of Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 685, 53 Stat. 1404.
Congress extended FELA's coverage to seamen in the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988).
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957).
4. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 382-83. The Third Circuit reversed the district court's order of
summary judgment for the railroad. Id. at 383.
This Case Comment focuses on the elements required to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under FELA. For a discussion of the state of the common law governing negligent infliction
of emotional distress, see Douglas B. Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A
Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of Objective
Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781 (1988).
5. The men began work at noon. The temperature was 95 degrees and the temperature of the rail
was 118 degrees. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 358. There was no shade at the work site. Id.
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employed James Gottshall, his friend Richard Johns,6 and seven other men
on a track repair job.7 Conrail worked the men hard,' and Johns died of
a heart attack on the worksite.9 Conrail ordered the men back to work
after Johns' death, keeping his body covered near the work site."0
Gottshall became extremely upset over the incident, took sick leave, and
ultimately never returned to work. He was admitted to a psychiatric
hospital and two doctors diagnosed him as suffering from "major
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.""
Gottshall filed suit under FELA alleging that Conrail negligently created
the circumstances which caused his friend's death. Gottshall also sought
damages for emotional and physical injuries caused from being forced to
watch and participate 3 in Johns' death. The district court granted
Conrail's motion for summary judgement. 4 The Third Circuit reversed
6. They had known each other for fifteen years, and Conrail knew they were "personal friends."
Id. at 359.
7. The court noted: "Most of the men were in their fifties and overweight. Conrail knew that one
worker had suffered a serious heart attack. It also knew Johns was overweight, had high blood pressure
and athero- or arterioscleric cardiovascular disease, and was taking medication." Id. at 358.
8. Conrail needed to repair these tracks because they were being used in violation of a safety
regulation and Conrail was scheduled for inspection. Id. The men were discouraged from taking rest
breaks, although they were allowed water, and it was difficult to take unscheduled breaks because the
men worked in teams. Id. The supervisor stated, "We aren't going to stop our maintenance work
because of the heat." Id.
9. Johns collapsed twice during the day. After Johns' first collapse, the supervisor did not send
for medical help. Instead, the supervisor ordered the men back to work after Johns regained
consciousness. Id. The second time Johns collapsed, it was obvious that he was having a heart attack,
and the supervisor sent for help. Because Conrail's communications equipment was down for
maintenance, it took between thirty minutes and an hour for help to arrive. Id. at 359. During this
time, Gottshall administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), but to no avail. Id. at 358. By the
time paramedics arrived, Johns had died. Id. at 359.
A Conrail supervisor later reprimanded Gottshall for administering CPRL Id.
10. Id. The supervisor kept the body by the tracks for three hours, until the coroner arrived. Id.
The supervisor ordered the men back to work because an empty coal train needed to use the line.
Id. When the men finished the work, the supervisor ordered them to stay at the worksite. Id.
11. Id. Although Gottshall returned to work the next day, he took time off after Johns' funeral.
Id. He went to his basement and stayed there until his father found him several days later. Id. He
became sick, lost his appetite, and became preoccupied with Johns' death. Id.
12. Id. at 360. Gottshall was having "suicidal preoccupations, anxiety, sleep onset insomnia, cold
sweats, loss of appetite, nausea, physical weakness, repetitive nightmares of the death scene and a fear
of leaving home." Id.
13. The court noted: "[Gottshall] was among the first to run to Johns' assistance. He gave mouth-
to-mouth resuscitation and CPR to Johns for a full forty minutes. He carried the body of his friend to
the ambulance parked two thousand feet away." Id. at 373.
14. Id. The district court reasoned, inter alia, that Gottshall's allegations did not allow recovery
under any common law theory of liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress, including the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss4/19
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and held that Gottshall had stated a claim with "sufficient indicia of
genuineness" to warrant a trial on the merits. 5
In enacting FELA, Congress intended to liberalize negligence law to
make it easier for railroad employees to recover against their employers. 6
Congress recognized that railroads were in a better position than their
workers to both prevent accidents and to bear the costs of employee
injuries resulting from accidents.17 Responding to congressional inten-
tions, courts have liberally construed the statute" and have extended
remedies under the statute to meet "changing conditions and changing
concepts of industry's duty toward its workers."' 9
bystander and zone of danger tests. Id. See Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 773 F. Supp. 778,
781 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
For a summary of common law tests for negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes
31-55 and accompanying text.
15. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 382-83. The major concern with claims alleging negligent infliction
of emotional distress is whether the claims are genuine. See infra notes 26-30, 47, 91 and
accompanying text. The court declined to rely exclusively on traditional common-law doctrines to test
the claim's "genuineness," but instead used a fact-based "totality of the factors" test. Gottshall, 988
F.2d at 371-74.
16. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987); Shenker v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1963); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R Co., 352 U.S. 500,507-08 (1957); H.R.
RaP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908). FELA allows a federal cause of action for negligence,
but eliminates certain common-law defenses including the doctrine of fellow servants, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1988), assumption of risk, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1988), and contributory negligence, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1988).
FELA nullifies contracts between employer and employee absolving the employer of liability for work-
related injuries, 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1988), and imposes a rule of comparative negligence, 45 U.S.C. § 53
(1988).
17. Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,432 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note
16, at 2; S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1908). For a history of the developments leading
up to the enactment of FELA, see generally Melvin L. Griffith, The Vindication of A National Public
Policy Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 160, 160-69 (1953).
18. Buell, 480 U.S. at 562 (citing Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506 and Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
180 (1949)).
19. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 432.
FELA has been criticized as outmoded because today railway workers could be covered by state
workers' compensation statutes which are administered more cheaply than a negligence tort-based
system. See generally Federal Employers'Liability Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
FELA in Relation to Amtrack Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress
Should Repeal the Federal Employers'Liability Act, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 79 (1992); Jerry J. Phillips,
An Evaluation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 49 (1988). Indeed,
recently there was movement in Congress to amend the statute. See Gary Taylor, Is FELA a Runaway
Train?, NAT'L L.J., April 30, 1990, at 1. See also H.R. 5853, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). However,
no proposals to amend FELA have been introduced in Congress since 1990.
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In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell,2" the Supreme Court
addressed the question whether emotional injuries were cognizable under
FELA.2" While refusing to decide the question,' the Court noted that
the issue should be resolved by reference to the particular facts of each
case, rather than by reference to abstract principals of law or statutory
construction.' Further, the Court "assumed" that FELA looks, at least in
part, to common-law developments in determining whether an injury is
actionable. 4 Thus, the Court left the lower courts to determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether wholly mental injuries are compensable.2
Because emotional injuries, unlike physical injuries, are difficult to see,
courts often voice policy concerns to limit the availability of recovery for
such injuries at common law.26 Courts are wary of recognizing actions
for emotional distress because of the dangers of: (1) allowing recovery for
relatively ephemeral mental injuries; 7 (2) permitting redress for false or
imagined injuries;28 and (3) subjecting defendants to potentially unlimited
20. 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
21. Id. at 567-71.
22. The appeal came from a motion for summary judgment, and the record was incomplete on "the
exact nature of the allegedly tortious activity, or the extent of the injuries that respondent claims to have
suffered." Id. at 567.
23. Id. at 568.
24. Id. (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949)). See also Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1929).
25. See 480 U.S. at 567-71; Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 360 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3264, 62 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1993); Gaston v. Flowers Transp.,
866 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1989).
26. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360-61 (5th
ed. 1984). Keeton lists four considerations that have been raised, but are generally regarded as
inadequate, to limit relief. These factors state that: (I) mental disturbance cannot be adequately
measured in monetary terms; (2) mental injury is too remote of a consequence from a negligent action;
(3) there is a lack of precedent; and (4) recognizing an action for emotional distress would allow for
a vast increase in litigation. Id. at 360.
Keeton answers the first of these concerns by noting that it is no more difficult to estimate damages
for mental injury than physical pain. Id. Addressing the second concern, Keeton argues that mental
injury can be directly related to a tortfeasor's negligent act and that there is no a priori reason to posit
an intervening cause in the case of mental injury. Id. On the third policy objection, Keeton suggests
that it is the business of the courts to create precedent and redress wrongs. Id. Finally, Keeton notes
that in states that give compensation for negligent distress, there has been no noticeable increase in
litigation. Id. See also Marlowe, supra note 4, at 788.
27. KEETON Er AL., supra note 26, at 361. This policy limitation seeks to avoid compensating
plaintiffs for trivial or insignificant injuries.
28. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss4/19
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liability.2 9 To meet these concerns, courts have formulated a number of
threshold tests to guarantee the genuineness of a claim.3 ° Briefly, courts
have required a plaintiff to establish: (1) that the plaintiff was physically
impacted by the tortfeasor (physical impact);31 (2) that the plaintiff was
in the zone of danger surrounding the negligent act (zone of danger);32 (3)
that the plaintiff's mental injury produced physically observable effects
29. Id. Courts fear that if traditional negligence principles alone rule recovery for emotional
distress, there might be no limit to the number of people to whom a tortfeasor would be liable. See
Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419,423 (N.Y. 1969) ("The problem of unlimited liability is suggested
by the unforeseeable consequence of extending recovery for harm to others than those directly involved
in the accident. If foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is extended the logic of the
principle would not and could not remain confined")
30. There is extensive law review commentary evaluating these tests and, in some instances,
proposing others. See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 333 (1984) (arguing for a general foreseeability test); David Crump,
Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "Intentional" or "Negligent" Infliction of Emotional
Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 24 ARiz. L. REV. 439
(1992) (arguing in favor of the zone of danger and Dillon bystander recovery rules); Julie A, Davies,
Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1992) (arguing
against the zone of danger and foreseeability approaches and proposing a limited duty rule); John L.
Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and
Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984) (arguing for a general foreseeability test
with limitations on the types of damages plaintiffs can recover); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 136 (1992) (arguing that "ethereal torts," i.e., violations of intangible interests such as
emotional security, breach of good faith, and interference with economic advantage, should be
recognized as causes of action allowing full compensation); Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime", 1 U. HAw.
L. REV. 1 (1979) (arguing for a general foreseeability approach, but limiting damages to economic
losses); Virginia E. Nolan and Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence
Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982) (arguing for a general foreseeability approach
when accompanied by "serious injuries"); Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477
(1982) (arguing for the zone of danger test); Mark A. Beede, Comment, Duty, Foreseeability, and the
Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 ME. L. REV. 303 (1981) (arguing for a case-by-case approach
"balancing the danger of unlimited liability against the need for compensation of serious injury"); Terri
Krivosha Herring, Note, Administering the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A
Synthesis, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 487 (1983) (suggesting a court-appointed medical expert render opinions
on the issues of proximate cause, foreseeability, and damages); Howard J. Kaplan, Note, Bystander
Recovery: A Policy Oriented Approach, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 877 (1987) (arguing for a modified
version of the Dillon criteria for bystander liability); Marlowe, supra note 4 (arguing for a definition
of foreseeable injury which measures the subjective distress against objective level of stress); Claudia
J. Wrazel, Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The "Bystander
Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (1981) (arguing for an action which would recognize
negligent infliction of emotional distress for bystanders who are emotionally unprepared for the
accident).
31. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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(physical manifestation);33 or (4) that the plaintiff satisfied the three
criteria enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg34
(Dillon factors).35 Alternatively, some courts simply apply general
negligence principles to injuries involving emotional distress (general
foreseeability)."
The "physical impact" test evolved from the traditional notion that
emotional distress is only compensable if sustained as a result of the
violation of some other protected interest.37 The test requires a plaintiff
to suffer a physical injury before the plaintiff may recover for an emotional
injury.3" Courts justify the test on the grounds that it avoids compensating
plaintiffs for false or trivial claims and that it avoids problems of unlimited
liability.39 The physical impact test, however, has been criticized as
overly arbitrary.' The physical impact requirement, while once viable,
has eroded to a mere formality41 and been abandoned altogether in most
jurisdictions.42
After abandoning the physical impact test many states adopted either the
"zone of danger" or the "physical manifestation" tests, or both.43 To
recover for emotional injury under the zone of danger, plaintiff must show
he was in imminent apprehension of physical harm." Under the physical
manifestation test, the plaintiff must show the emotional injury caused some
physical injury."5 These tests limit the number of potential defendants by
allowing recovery only in certain circumstances where emotional injury is
33. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
34. 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
35. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
37. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 782-83.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 784; Beede, supra note 30, at 307.
40. See Marlowe, supra note 4, at 793-94; Pearson, supra note 30, at 488-89. The test is arbitrary
because it is both over- and underinclusive. It is underinclusive because it refuses recovery if real
emotional distress has been incurred, but the plaintiffwas not physically touched. Marlowe, supra note
4, at 793-94. The test is overinclusive because it allows recovery for relatively inconsequential mental
injury if accompanied with a physical impact. See Beede, supra note 30, at 307-08 & n.29.
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 363-64 (noting cases which held that slight blows, trivial
jolts or jars, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke satisfy the physical impact requirement).
42. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 26, at 364; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,
569 n.20 (1987).
43. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 796-98. The Restatement adopts a physical manifestation test.
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436, 436A (1965).
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plausible,46 and help to guarantee the legitimacy of the claim.47 Howev-
er, courts and commentators criticize these tests as inadequate because like
the physical impact test, they too are arbitrary.48
Several jurisdictions further liberalized their rules for recovery by
allowing bystanders to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In Dillon v. Legg,49 the California Supreme Court enunciated three factors
sufficient for a bystander claim: (1) the plaintiff must be located near the
scene of the accident; (2) the plaintiff's shock must result from a "direct
emotional impact upon [the] plaintiff from the sensory and contemporane-
ous observa[tion] of the accident"; and (3) the plaintiff and the victim must
be closely related."0 The Dillon court relied on negligence principles to
avoid subjecting defendants to unlimited liability,5" and rejected the
possibility of fraudulent claims as a basis for denying recovery for an entire
class of actions." Many states have adopted these criteria wholesale, or
to supplement other requirements.53 Again, critics claim these criteria are
46. The tests limited recovery to only those cases in which the defendant was in peril of physical
injury from the defendant's negligent act or those in which the defendant subsequently manifested
physical symptoms of her injury. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 795-96.
47. The fact that the plaintiff was exposed to physical harm or manifested verifiable physical
symptoms was evidence that the injury was, in fact, genuine. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 436A, cmt. b. (1965) ("[I]n the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting
bodily harm, such emotional disturbance may be too easily feigned. .. .'.
48. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 801-03; Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,915-16 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
The physical manifestation requirement is overinclusive because it allows for recovery in trivial
situations if the distress is accompanied by a physical manifestation. The test is underinclusive because
it denies recovery in situations in which, despite real mental injury, no physical symptoms are
manifested. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 801-02. Courts and commentators have asserted that the
physical manifestation requirement is unnecessary in light of medical developments which allow reliable
diagnosis of true emotional injury. See Marlowe, supra note 4, at 802; cf Bell, supra note 30, at 351-
52.
The zone of danger test is underinclusive because it denies recovery to bystanders who, although
they are not in the zone of danger, nonetheless suffer real emotional injury from a tortfeasor's
negligence. Likewise, it is overinclusive because it allows recovery in instances in which a plaintiff
has incurred no real harm. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915-16; Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ohio
1983).
49. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en bane).
50. Id. at 920.
51. Id. at 919.
52. Id. at 917. The court emphasized that the relation between the plaintiff and the victim would
guarantee the veracity of the claim. Id.
53. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 807. Other jurisdictions have added the requirement that the
plaintiff witness an "objectively serious injury" to the third party. Id. For a list of jurisdictions
adopting the Dillon test, see id. at 806 n.139.
The Dillon court was concerned with fashioning a cause of action for bystanders whose emotional
injuries were reasonably foreseeable, and in fact propounded these criteria merely as "guidelines" for
Washington University Open Scholarship
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both over- and underinclusive 4 This criticism has led a few courts to
reject the Dillon criteria and embrace a general foreseeability requirement,
essentially treating emotional injury as any other injury and applying
traditional negligence law.55
The circuits are split on the question of what test to use for claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress under FELA 6 In a series of
cases, the Fifth Circuit, while rejecting most of the common-law tests, left
open the question whether a plaintiff in the zone of danger may recover for
use in the determination of foreseeability. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. However, most jurisdictions which
have adopted the criteria have applied them mechanically, interpreting the approach set forth in Dillon
as a rigid test to be satisfied, rather than focusing on reasonable foreseability. See Bell, supra note 30,
at 339-40. Indeed, California itself, while limiting the Dillon factors to bystander situations, Molien
v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 816 (Cal. 1980), has resorted to mechanical applications of
these criteria. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
54. These criteria do not circumscribe, to a reasonable degree of exactness, all potential plaintiffs
with genuine emotional injuries. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 814; see also Bell, supra note 30, at 338-
40; Diamond, supra note 30, at 483-93; Pearson, supra note 30 at 494-500.
55. Marlowe, supra note 4, at 81417. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 364-65. Basically these
courts have assumed that proof of the traditional negligence elements of duty, breach, and proximate
cause would effectively prevent fraudulent claims and protect defendants from unlimited liability. See,
ag., McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1982] 2 All E.R. 298, 311-13 (Lord Bridge); Marlowe, supra note 4, at
815-16. However, some courts advocating this approach require a showing of severe emotional distress.
See, e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio 1983); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520
(Haw. 1970).
56. See Gottshall, 988 F.2d 355 (rejecting common law tests and embracing a "totality of the
circumstances" test); Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (rejecting all tests
but zone of danger, but refusing to pass on the issue of whether that test was appropriate), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 604 (1992); Elliot v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (requiring
outrageous conduct); Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 1990) (dictum)
(requiring outrageous conduct or unconscionable abuse); Hammond v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 848 F.2d
95, 97 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring physical contact or threat of physical contact), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1032 (1989); Taylor v. Burlington N.R.R. 787 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1986) (pre-Buell decision
stating that "wholly mental injuries" are cognizable under FELA). See also Moody v. Maine Cent.
R.R., 823 F.2d 693, 694 (Ist Cir. 1987) ("We discern from the Buell opinion an attempt to leave the
door to recovery for wholly emotional injury somewhat ajar but not by any means wide open.').
The dicta expressed by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in Elliott and Adams, respectively, appear to
be based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. First, outrageous conduct has traditionally been
required in proving intentional infliction of emotional distress. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, §
12, at 60-61; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 (1965). Indeed, the very concept of
outrageousness entails a notion of intentional or, at least, reckless behavior. Second, the courts rely on
the Fifth Circuit case, Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210 (1990), which concerned the intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Id. at 1214 n.4. See Elliot, 910 F.2d at 1229; Adams 899 F.2d at 540. Third,
these courts rely on an incorrect interpretation of Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 566
n.13 (1987). In Buell, the court referred to claims filed under the Railway Labor Act for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 362-63 n.3.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss4/19
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mental injury. In Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services,5 7 the Fifth Circuit
ruled that a seaman who had been soaked with toxic chemicals may sue for
mental injuries suffered on account of his fear of contracting cancer."
While the plaintiff satisfied the physical impact and physical manifestation
tests,59 the court eschewed these tests as "unrealistic," and decided that the
circumstances surrounding the incident supplied "sufficient indicia of
genuineness."'  In its denial of a hearing en banc, the court stated that it
had offered "no opinion as to the nature of the injury required to give rise
to an actionable claim.'
In Gaston v. Flowers Transportation,62 the Fifth Circuit denied recovery
for purely emotional injuries to a bystander.3 In Gaston, a seaman
sought damages for mental injuries resulting from witnessing his half-
brother being crushed to death between two vessels.' Implicitly rejecting
the Dillon criteria,' the court argued that there was little precedent to
support recovery in a bystander case.' The court claimed that imposing
liability in such a case would not further FELA's purpose of providing
incentives to employers to operate more safely.67 Moreover, to find for
the plaintiff in such a case would expose employers to virtually unlimited
liability.6 The Gaston court, however, was careful to limit its holding to
recovery for bystanders. 9
57. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 319. The plaintiff sued under the Jones Act, which extended the protections of FELA
to seamen. See supra note 3.
59. Plaintiff suffered "dizziness, leg cramps and a persistent stinging sensation in feet and fingers,"
although he suffered no symptoms of cancer. Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 317. Thus, his claim satisfied the
physical manifestation test. Because he was physically contacted by the chemicals, his claim also
satisfied the physical impact test.
60. Id. at 318. The court also noted that other courts had "long allowed plaintiffs to recover for
psychic and emotional harm" both in FELA and Jones Act cases, as well as in other contexts. Id.
61. Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., 797 F.2d 256 (1986).
62. 866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 821.
64. Id. at 816-17.
65. Plaintiff was near to the accident, exposed to sensory and contemporaneous observation of the
accident, and closely related to the victim. Id. at 816. Thus, despite the fact his claim met the Dillon
test, the court denied recovery.
66. Id. at 817. For criticism of this rationale, see supra note 26.
67. 866 F.2d at 820. While FELA is concerned with creating incentives for employers to operate
more safely, it is based on other rationales as well, such as shifting costs to the better cost bearer. See
supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
68. 866 F.2d at 819-20. For criticism of this rationale, see supra notes 51, 55 and accompanying
text.
69. 866 F.2d at 821.
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Finally, in Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc.,70 the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc
upheld a panel decision dismissing a tugboat captain's suit for emotional
distress incurred after rescuing the crew of a barge that had exploded and
caught fire.71 The court held that the plaintiff's injury was not a reason-
ably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and, therefore,
the plaintiff had not stated a prima facie case of negligence.72 The court
did not reach the question of when recovery for emotional injuries was
permissible.73  However, the court affirmed that Gaston was still
controlling in the Fifth Circuit, implicitly refusing to recognize the Dillon
criteria or general foreseeability tests, but leaving open the question
whether a plaintiff could recover under the zone of danger test.74
The Seventh Circuit also considered the issue of recovery for negligently
inflicted emotional injuries in Lancaster v. Norfolk and Western Rail-
way.75 In Lancaster, the court determined whether the Railway Labor
Act76 supplants FELA for mental injuries. The court found that FELA
does not create a cause of action for injuries caused about by actions which
lack physical contact or the threat of physical contact.77 The court did not
go so far as to embrace the zone of danger test, however, because it
predicated FELA liability on actions which constitute a traditional tort, such
as assault, battery, and negligent infliction of physical injury.78 Thus, it
appears that the Seventh Circuit has implicitly embraced a physical contact
requirement to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. After
70. 966 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
71. Id. at 167.
72. Id. at 168-69.
73. Id. at 169.
74. Id.
75. 773 F.2d 807 (1985).
76. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347,44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88
(1988)). The Railway Labor Act requires workers with minor disputes to resolve their claim through
arbitration. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). For a discussion of the interaction of the Railway Labor Act and
FELA for claims of emotional distress, see C. Sue Barnett, The Railway Labor Act and the Federal
Employers' Liability Act: Naming a "Minor Dispute" "FELA Emotional Distress" and Making It
Sweeter, 823 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 391 (1993).
77. Id. at 813.
78. Id. at 815. Although the language of FELA only addresses negligence explicitly, the Supreme
Court ruled that FELA encompasses intentional torts as well if the intentional action was reasonably
foreseeable by the employer. Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R.., 372 U.S. 248, 249 (1963); Lillie v.
Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947). But see Davis v. Green, 260 U.S. 349, 351-52 (1922)
(holding an employer was not liable for damages arising from "a willful and wanton killing" of an
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the Supreme Court's decision in Buell, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
Lancaster in Hammond v. Terminal Railroad Ass 'n.7
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Buell, which vacated the Ninth
Circuit's holding that wholly emotional injuries are compensable under
FELA, 0 the Ninth Circuit has not clearly adopted a standard applicable
in FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress cases involving purely
emotional injuries. In Pierce v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,"8 the
Ninth Circuit was confronted with a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim brought under FELA. The court affirmed a judgment
awarding damages to a plaintiff who sustained a heart attack as a result of
his employer's negligence.8 2 The court, in a footnote, observed that it did
not need to decide whether a claim stating "purely emotional injuries" was
compensable under FELA because Pierce suffered a heart attack-a
physical manifestation of his emotional distress.8 3 Thus, at a minimum,
the Ninth Circuit's ruling lends support to a physical manifestation test for
FELA claims.8 4
In Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,"5 the Third Circuit looked to
whether the totality of the facts stated a claim for emotional injury with
"sufficient indicia of genuiness."86 The court first examined the language
of FELA and noted that, on its face, the statute does not distinguish
between physical and emotional injury.8 7 The court then determined that
the Supreme Court's holding in Buell left federal courts free to determine
whether "negligent infliction of emotional distress is actionable under
FELA."88 The Gottshall court also noted that Buell required it to look to
79. 848 F.2d 95, 97 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032 (1989). Hammond, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under FELA
because it was "clearly barred by Lancaster." Id.
80. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
81. 823 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987).
82. The jury found the defendant guilty of inflicting "mental anguish" on plaintiff by "pulling him
out of service" and subjecting him to an investigation. Id. at 1368 & n.1.
83. Id. at 1372 n.2.
84. This ruling is further supported by an earlier Ninth Circuit decision. In Taylor v. Burlington
N.R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986), the court stated that it had reservations about its holding
that wholly mental injuries are cognizable under FELA. Id. at 1313. Nevertheless, the court stated that
the presence of physical injury justified its conclusion. Id.
85. 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3264, 62 U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1993).
86. Id. at 382-83. The court reversed the district court's order of summary judgment for Conrail
and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 358.
87. See supra note 3.
88. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 360. See supra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text.
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the common law for guidance in this inquiry. 9
The Third Circuit then surveyed the various common-law requirements
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.9" The court stated that while
the common-law tests create arbitrary rules, they all address the same
consideration: because genuine mental injuries are much more difficult to
recognize than genuine physical injuries, the tests help courts to winnow
meritorious claims from frivolous ones.9' However, the Third Circuit
decided that the result of this approach was to focus courts' attention on the
mechanical application of these tests, blinding courts to circumstances in
which a claim is indeed meritorious even though it does not fit any
accepted test.92
After surveying the decisions of the circuit courts, the Third Circuit
determined that no common view exists among the circuits concerning the
elements required to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under FELA.93 The court then examined the history and purpose
of FELA94 and found that FELA had a broad remedial scope designed to
hold carriers to a higher standard of conduct than the common law.95
Further, the court commented that the federal courts' adherence to the
common law when interpreting FELA could "create fifty versions of what
should be unified federal law."96 Thus, the court rejected the common
law as controlling in FELA determinations. 97
The Third Circuit concluded that the inquiry as to whether a claim had
been stated was not exclusively rooted in rules of law, but was also a fact-
specific inquiry which relied on the liberal policies underlying FELA.98
The court found that because Gottshall's complaint satisfied the bystand-
er 99 and physical manifestation"°° common-law tests, because he was an
89. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 360. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
90. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 361-62. For a summary of these tests, see supra notes 26-49 and
accompanying text.
91. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 361. See supra notes 26-27, 47 and accompanying text.
92. 988 F.2d at 361-62.
93. Id. at 365. See supra notes 56-83 and accompanying text.
94. 988 F.2d at 366-69. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
95. 988 F.2d at 369.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 371 (citing Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1986)).
99. Id. at 371-73. The court here found that Gottshall's claim satisfied the general foreseeability
test and the reasonable foreseeability requirement embedded in the Dillon criteria. See supra notes 53,
55 and accompanying text.
100. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 373-74. The court noted he had manifested such symptoms as weight
loss, institutionalization, insomnia, cold sweats, loss of appetite, nausea, and physical weakness. Id.
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active participant in his friend's death,1"' and because there was sufficient
evidence of an emotional injury,02 Gottshall met the threshold burden of
showing a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.0 3 The
court answered common-law concerns of unlimited liability and permitting
redress for trivial and fraudulent claims by asserting that traditional
negligence principles would constrain these problems. In any event, the
court reasoned that the policies behind FELA required the railroads to bear
these risks." The court concluded that under the totality of the facts,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Gottshall had stated a
cognizable claim under FELA.105
The court in Gottshall reached the correct result. Congress intended
FELA to be a broad remedial statute, which imposes a higher duty on
employers than they bear at common law.1°6 Indeed, the state of the
common law under negligent infliction of emotional distress is analogous
to the state of the negligence law which Congress intended to reform
through FELA. At the turn of the century, many plaintiffs were prevented
from recovering for injuries resulting from their employers' negligent acts
due to arbitrary and outmoded common-law defenses."0 7 Likewise, today,
in many jurisdictions potential plaintiffs are barred from recovering for
mental injuries because arbitrary rules prevent them from presenting
meritorious claims.0 8 The Third Circuit took an appropriate path by
avoiding the arbitrary results of the common-law tests, while protecting
potential defendants from fraudulent claims and unlimited liability.0 9
The Third Circuit struck an appropriate balance between the traditional
101. Id. at 373. The court relied on the holding in Althoffv. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 87-4384,
1988 WL 61734 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 1988), endorsed by the Third Circuit in Outten v. National tLR.
Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), that an active participant in an accident could state a claim
for emotional injuries under FELA. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 373.
102. Id. at 374.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 379-82.
105. Id. at 382-83. The court also found that the claim asserted sufficient facts to find breach of
a duty, injury, and causation. Id. at 374-79.
Judge Roth, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the court on whether Gottshall
had stated a cognizable claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under FELA. Id. at 383. His
dissent was based on his finding that the plaintiff had not specified a negligent act attributable to
Conrail, and any injury that he did suffer was simply not a foreseeable consequence of any of Conrail's
actions. Id. at 383-86 (citing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)).
106. See supra notes 16-19, 95 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 16 and accompanying text
108. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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purposes of FELA and the common-law reservations regarding negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The court's interpretation requires that
claims state sufficient facts that, under the totality of the circumstances,
show the emotional injury to be genuine.
Edmund C. Baird, III
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